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The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece is an interesting collection of nine essays from 
distinguished scholars in the field of Greek law, which examines, for the most part, the 
connection between the laws and the courts in Classical Athens. The book contains an 
introduction by the editors Edward Harris and Lene Rubinstein. It is divided into four 
sections. Edward Harrris ‘Antigone the Lawyer, or the Ambiguities of Nomos’, Robert 
Parker ‘What are Sacred Laws?’ and F.S. Naiden ‘Supplication and the Law’ comprise 
the first section entitled ‘Law, Religion, and the Sources of Legitimacy’ where the 
relationship between polis law and divine law, the secular and the sacred, is explored. In 
the second section entitled ‘The Role of Law in the Athenian Courts’ the focus narrows 
as James Sickinger writes on ‘The Laws of Athens: Publication, Preservation, 
Consultation’ and Christopher Carey concerns himself with ‘Offence and Procedure in 
Athenian Law’. The focus on Athens continues in the third section entitled ‘Legal 
Arguments in Attic Orators’. Peter J. Rhodes discusses ‘Keeping to the Point’ while 
Adriaan Lanni examines ‘Arguing from ‘Precedent’: Modern Perspectives on Athenian 
Practice’. In the final section entitled ‘The Rule of Law Outside Athens’ attention moves 
away from Athens as Michael Gagarin examines ‘The Rule of Law in Gortyn’ and 
Angelos Chaniotis writes on ‘Justifying Territorial Claims in Classical and Hellenistic 
Greece: The Beginnings of International Law’. The book provides a comprehensive 
bibliography and a helpful Index Locorum. In general the essays in this collection are not 
concerned to provide startling new theories on how Greek law and the courts operated, 
but rather they tend to tease out more fully our established ideas about the structure and 
dynamic of Greek law, here, essentially Athenian law.  
 
E. Harris begins his article ‘Antigone the Lawyer, or the Ambiguities of Nomos’ with an 
exploration of what it was that constituted a nomos. What was it that established a law as 
valid? H. notes that a nomos required four criteria: (1) it had to be enforceable, (2) it had 
to be applied to all similar situations in the future, (3) it had to state the rights and duties 
of the parties involved and (4) it had to contain a sanction. A valid polis nomos was also 
necessarily sanctioned at divine level. H. makes clear in his discussion that laws which 
satisfied the above conditions differed greatly from the mere commands or edicts of 
magistrates. Magistrates were not synonymous with the law, and it was quite clear that 
they were not above it. This is evident in the fact that the democracy at Athens, with its 
periodic reviews, held them responsible for their activities in a very public way. The 
central idea that the law in Athens was tied to a democratic ideal is then brought out by 
H. in an examination of Sophocles’ Antigone. Here H. argues that Creon is brought low 
because he confuses his own polis edict regarding the non-burial of Polynices with a 
genuine nomos. An Athenian audience, H. suggests, would have sympathized with the 
position of Antigone and her attempt to uphold an established divine law enshrining the 
importance of burial. Robert Parker follows this with a brief essay on the topic of ‘sacred 
laws’. The thrust of the article consists of an attempt to establish what exactly constituted 
a sacred law. After an examination of a number of such laws P. demonstrates that, once 
again, there is no emphatic dividing line between the sacred and secular, between the 
human and the divine, and therefore, there is no clear category of ‘sacred laws’ into 
which all such laws will fit comfortably. F.S. Naiden completes this section with an 
apposite topic: ‘Supplication and the Law’. N. demonstrates that supplication involved 
both the sacred and the secular. The possibility and performance of supplication might 
well involve a combination of the divine and human, with polis law sometimes 
forbidding access to divine law. It was not by any means a clear-cut affair and this 
complexity is brought out through a comparison of two case studies: the straightforward 
case of the metic Dioscurides and Aeschylus’ Suppliants, which highlights the necessary 
blend between the divine and the daily life of the polis. So this section ends on a note on 
which it began; the need to appreciate that the line between sacred and secular is often 
blurred. 
 
James Sickinger’s essay on ‘The Laws of Athens: Publication, Preservation, 
Consultation’ begins the second section and brings a more pronounced focus on the 
Athenian law-courts of the Classical period. S. notes that although orators in the law-
courts make frequent references to written laws, many of the laws referred to are not 
extant in epigraphic form. S. suggests that the publishing and preserving of laws may not 
have carried an exactitude that we imagine, but he is satisfied that the average Athenian 
could find the law that he required, otherwise we would hear more about its problematic 
nature in the extant literary source material. This section on Athenian law is completed 
by Christopher Carey with his essay ‘Offence and Procedure in Athenian Law’ which 
examines how much flexibility a prosecutor had in prosecuting certain crimes. C.’s 
discussion centres on a passage from Demosthenes Against Androtion which suggests 
that a prosecutor often had a variety of legal options at his disposal (dike or graphe), 
when it came to taking a defendant to court. C.’s thorough analysis demonstrates that in 
reality the prosecutor had fewer options that Demosthenes would have us believe. When 
the prosecutor did appear to have a choice he might still be constrained by the particular 
circumstances surrounding the crime.        
    
The third section concerns itself with legal arguments in the Attic orators. P.J. Rhodes in 
‘Keeping to the Point’ surveys the body of extant forensic oratory in an effort to 
determine whether or not litigants digressed frequently from the issue at hand. The idea 
that they did is a view that has gained currency, based on the idea that trials often became 
disputes between rich men who sought to gain an advantage in the courts through 
introducing damaging, but irrelevant, material. R. notes that he too subscribed to this 
view in the past, but here he retracts somewhat this earlier opinion, acknowledging that 
litigants, more often than not, did focus on the topic at hand, if we accept that there was a 
legitimate need at times to present the ‘bigger picture’. Acceptance of a higher standard 
of relevance in these forensic speeches also has implications for seeing them as simple 
contests among the wealthy. Adriaan Lanni’s short essay ‘Arguing from ‘Precedent’: 
Modern Perspectives on Athenian Practice’ completes this section. L.’s article ties in with 
one theme from the last section: what access did litigants have and what use did they 
make of previous records of cases stored in the Metroon? Even if litigants did have 
access to records, it is clear as L. demonstrates, that they did not argue from precedent as 
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one does in most modern legal systems. She concludes that the law-courts ‘doled out 
largely ad hoc judgments’ (p.167). 
 
In the final section Michael Gagarin examines the idea of the ‘rule of law’ in the Greek 
world in general, and in particular at Grotyn, in Crete, where we have extant the largest 
set of legal regulations outside Athens, preserved in the form of inscriptions. G. suggests 
that the ‘rule of law’ ought to embody three basic ideas: the regulation of society 
according to rules, the idea that no man is above the law and a strict adherence to the 
requirement of the law (p. 173). In examining the inscriptions at Gortyn, G. demonstrates 
that the Gortynians were attempting clearly to enforce these three basic meanings in their 
written law code. The final paper entitled ‘Justifying Territorial Claims in Classical and 
Hellenistic Greece: The Beginnings of International Law’ by Angelos Chaniotis 
demonstrates that Greek poleis did indeed share some general legal principles, and some 
specific legal concepts, when engaged in territorial disputes. He comes to this conclusion 
by establishing four legitimate modes of acquisition: inheritance, sale, conquest and gift, 
and through a number of case studies of international arbitration demonstrates that the 
Greeks did consistently recognise principles though which international relations were 
regulated.  
 
The book is well produced with a minimum of typographical errors. Anyone interested in 
correcting these for a paperback edition may find them on pp. 1, 4, 27, 43, 44, 46, 48, 72, 
76 and 82. 
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